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Abstract
This article analyses the constitutional, statutory and informal arrangements available to the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic 
for participation in EU decision making. The focus is on the 2006 European Scrutiny Act, the 2010 reform of the scrutiny procedures 
and the Barroso initiative. These developments provide a solid basis on which the Assembly’s dependence on the Government can 
be reduced. The informal method of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs hitherto practised in Portugal has morphed into a docu-
ment-based system. In these respects, the Portuguese Parliament no longer deserves the epithet of a laggard.
Introduction: taking stock of the 
research on national parliaments 
in the EU
National parliaments first received academic attention 
in the early 1970s. As Niblock (1971: 20-21) observed in 
his pioneering work, besides the ratification processes, 
domestic legislatures were only involved in the 
implementation of directives. This did not permit ex 
ante parliamentary pronouncement, that is before the 
decision has been made at the Community level. The 
governments’ dominance over the European agenda 
was a universal diagnosis. Many a national parliament 
was relegated to the status of a rubber-stamping body. 
Parliamentary intervention was, therefore, “isolated and 
sporadic” (Niblock 1971: 24). 
These problems became emphatic in post-Maastricht 
period, when the literature on the democratic deficit 
spawned ceaselessly (Marquardt 1994; Kuper 1998; 
Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). National parliaments 
were recognised as a suitable institutional remedy 
for the scanty representative basis of the newly 
established European Union (EU or the Union). Their 
electoral proximity to the citizen and conduciveness 
to engendering partisan political debates were 
precious assets. Yet the scholarly analyses in this 
period have shown that national parliaments were 
passive and disengaged. With the notable exception of 
Denmark, they were unable satisfactorily to hold their 
governments to account for the positions defended in 
the Council of Ministers (Council) (Laursen and Pappas 
1995; Norton 1996; Smith 1996). 
The most emblematic modes of parliamentary 
adjustment to a more potent Union were the 
establishment of committees devoted to EU affairs, a 
closer association of specialised committees and the 
crafting of instruments for the scrutiny of EU decision 
making. Overall, however, the national parliaments’ 
reaction was sluggish (Maurer and Wessels 2001). The 
efforts in designing a collective role for them were of 
limited impact, too. COSAC, a biannual conference of 
European Affairs Committees of national parliaments 
and the European Parliament, was successful in 
coordinating an exchange of views and best practices, 
but it lacks binding thrust regarding EU initiatives 
(Tordoff 2000; Latek 2003). By contrast, the Assizes 
meeting held in 1990 was a failure.
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With the Constitutional Treaty came the idea of ex 
ante involvement of domestic parliaments, which 
was elaborated in the Lisbon Treaty. The latter Treaty 
endows on national parliaments several European 
functions (Barrett 2008; Passos 2008; Gennart 2010; 
Delcamp 2011; Kiiver 2011). The most important among 
them are the monitoring of subsidiarity, the policing of 
certain bridging clauses and the control over Europol 
and Eurojust. 
While a part of the literature on the role of national 
parliaments in the European Union has accordingly 
begun probing deeper into their Europeanisation (Auel 
2007a; Besselink 2006; Pliakos 2007), separate country 
studies have progressed unevenly. The focus has 
primarily been on the parliaments of western, northern 
and, of late, central and eastern European Member 
States (Kiiver 2006; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Tans 
2008; Barrett 2008). Southern European parliaments 
have either been omitted or treated as a group, without 
further inquiring into the intricacies of their scrutiny 
arrangements (Bandeira 2003; Magone 2007a; Magone 
2007b). This was justified to some extent, because the 
parliaments of southern Europe exhibit similar patterns 
of institutional behaviour, marked by inertia and 
subordination to their governments.
In this contribution, we address this shortcoming in 
respect of the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic 
(Assembleia da República or Assembly), the analysis of 
which is slowly moving away from the unabated focus 
on the consolidation of democracy (Bandeira 2004 and 
2001; Corkill 1993; Manuel 1996; Maxwell and Monje 
1991) towards Europeanisation. The powers of the 
Assembly have not been examined in detail elsewhere 
in the literature and where they have been the object 
of analysis, they are largely out of date due to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This paper seeks 
to fill this gap. More concretely, we seek to answer the 
question of whether the Portuguese Parliament is still a 
laggard in EU affairs. Has the Assembly Europeanised? 
Has it reacted to the challenges posed by European 
integration? 
To this end, we furnish an in-depth insight into the 
constitutional, statutory and informal arrangements 
for the Assembly’s participation in the shaping of 
EU policies. The article argues that the Portuguese 
Parliament has availed itself of scrutiny methods that 
can reduce its hitherto virtually exclusive dependence 
on the Government and that a catalyst for this was 
the establishment of closer links with the European 
Commission (Commission). While we do not carry out 
an empirical analysis of the actual scrutiny of secondary 
EU decision making, some examples from the Barroso 
initiative and statistical data corroborating the main 
argument are provided.
Taking Portugal’s Parliament 
seriously: from laggard to 
strategic Europeaniser
Being part of the European Union is probably the 
greatest historical moment of Portuguese history since 
the Age of Discoveries. (Magone 2006: 11)
Having spent a long time with its back turned to the 
continent of Europe, and not having been quick enough 
to interpret the historic destiny of its colonial period, 
Portugal let itself be left on the fringe of the European 
family and fell into a position that placed it politically 
and economically on the periphery […but…] today we 
see Europe as another name for freedom. (Costa 2000: 
7, 9)1
A befitting point of departure for the present purposes 
is an argument advanced a decade ago regarding 
the impact of European integration on the system of 
government and Parliament of Portugal. It was then 
maintained that the accelerated pace of integration 
had had a profound and adverse effect in four main 
respects: (a) the loss of legislative competence; (b) 
the governmentalisation of the political decision to 
revise the Constitution; (c) the growing importance 
of compromises agreed by the Government at the EU 
level that are presented to Parliament as fait accompli; 
and (d) the absence of relations with EU institutions 
(Miranda João 2000: 16).
Until 2006, Portugal practised the “system of informal 
influence” (Fraga 2001b) or “system of information” (Filipe 
2005: 69), which means that there was no systematic 
scrutiny of EU matters but only limited supervision 
through irregular meetings with the Government. This 
situation was steeped in the consensus among the 
largest political parties about the positive impact of 
European integration on Portugal. As a consequence, 
EU matters were not politicised, cleavages did not 
occur and Europe was kept outside Parliament (Paulo 
and Bandeira 2006: 6; Lobo 2003). For these reasons, the 
Assembly excessively depended on the Government for 
information and could not exert any decisive influence 
even in the fields of its exclusive legislative competence 
1  Francisco Seixas da Costa was the Secretary of State for 
European Affairs of Portugal from 1995 to 2001.
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(Filipe 2005: 71; Magone 1996: 153). The patchy nature 
of European scrutiny was also a corollary of the 
internal process of democratic consolidation, because 
it expedited the entrenchment of the Government’s 
preponderance over the Assembly. The two legislatures 
with absolute majorities mustered by a single political 
party, the Social Democrats, namely V legislature (1987-
1991) and VI legislature (1991-1995), represented a step 
further in subjugating the Assembly to the Government 
(Bandeira 1996).
Meanwhile, other Member States installed mechanisms 
that permit substantive participation in secondary EU 
decision making. Several examples suffice to juxtapose 
the Portuguese Parliament against its counterparts.
France, for instance, introduced in 1992 a constitutional 
possibility for both the Assemblée nationale and the 
Sénat to adopt politically binding European resolutions.2 
In 1994 the French Government committed to a 
scrutiny reserve (réserve d’examen parlementaire),3 
whereby nowadays during eight weeks no agreement 
will be given in the Council if Parliament has expressed 
intention to examine a certain draft EU legislative act.4 
In the United Kingdom, there is a long tradition of 
applying the scrutiny reserve, whose existence in an 
inchoate form dates back to the negotiations following 
the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community.5 
Presently, there are two types of scrutiny reserve in 
Britain: (a) a general one, which applies to any EU 
initiative and which is not limited in time; and (b) a 
special one, which applies to the Government’s decision 
on whether to opt into a given draft EU measure in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and which must 
be exercised within eight weeks.6 Westminster further 
relies on regular scrutiny reports as well as in-depth 
inquiries into salient matters on the EU roster. 
In Germany, the legitimating role of the Bundestag in 
EU affairs has been a pivotal issue since the Maastricht 
Treaty. The Bundesverfassungsgericht reiterated in 
its landmark Lissabon-Urteil of 2009 that national 
2  Article 88-4(2) of the French Constitution.
3  Circulaire du 19 juillet 1994 relative à la prise en compte 
de la position du Parlement français dans l’élaboration des actes 
communautaires, points I and II.
4  Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 relative à la participation du 
Parlement national au processus décisionnel européen, annexe, 
point III.3. See more on the French Parliament’s European scrutiny 
in (Siritzky 2008).
5  See the undertaking by Minister Duncan Sandys in: 
House of Commons, Debate of 21 February 1955, Vol. 537, col. 
886.
6 See further on the British Parliament’s European scrutiny 
in (Cygan 2007; Kerse 2008).
parliaments were the primary, fundamental source of the 
Union’s democratic legitimacy, whereas the European 
Parliament was merely a secondary, complementary 
source (Jančić 2010: 355-356). In response to this 
judgement, the German Parliament made enactments 
(Jančić 2010: 371), inter alia, to concretise both the 
constitutional right of the Bundestag to state its 
position before the EU legislative process begins and 
the corresponding duty of the Federal Government to 
take this position into account in Council negotiations.7 
As a consequence, the Government shall henceforth 
use the Bundestag’s position statement as a basis in the 
negotiations and is obliged to report on the manner in 
which it has been asserted in the Council. Furthermore, if 
the Government is unable to exact the MPs’ concerns in 
the negotiations, it must invoke a parliamentary reserve 
(Parlamentsvorbehalt). If a consensus with the Bundestag 
cannot be reached, the Government may only deviate 
from the position statement for important reasons of 
foreign or integration policies (Jančić 2010: 377).
Denmark is famous for giving ministers politically 
binding mandates for Council negotiations. These 
mandates are, in fact, not formally issued but are 
considered agreed if no member of the European Affairs 
Committee opposes the Government’s negotiating 
plans. The practice of mandates became customary 
following the political crisis of February 1973, which 
broke out because the Minister of Agriculture accepted 
an interim price arrangement for Danish export 
bacon without securing the backing of the Folketing 
(Fitzmaurice 1976: 286; Laursen 2005).
This system contrasts with the Austrian one, where the 
Nationalrat and the Bundesrat may adopt legally binding 
opinions, which the Federal Government is obliged to 
respect during the negotiation and voting phases of 
EU decision making.8 Deviation is only admissible for 
imperative reasons of foreign and integration policies. 
Yet it has been attested that despite an animated start, 
Parliament incrementally reduced the use of legally 
binding opinions (Pollak and Slominski 2003: 713). 
One possible reason was the negative experience with 
the very first such opinion. This was in 1995, when 
the Minister for Agriculture was forced to vote against 
a directive on animal transport but was outvoted 
and a solution unfavourable to Austria was adopted 
nonetheless (Pollak and Slominski 2003: 714; Blümel 
and Neuhold 2001: 329).
 Not all Member States are avid European 
7 Article 23(3) of the Grundgesetz.
8 Article 23e(2) and (6) of the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz.
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scrutineers, however. Such is, for instance, the case with 
Belgium (Vos 2007) and Greece (Zervakis and Yannis 
2001), whose Parliaments are content to give their 
Governments a free hand both in the general conduct 
of their country’s EU policy as well as in Council 
negotiations proper.
This brief summary warrants the conclusion that the 
Portuguese Assembly deserved to be placed within 
the group of inactive parliaments. Indeed, all these 
considerations have led to orthodox descriptions of the 
Portuguese Parliament as slow adapter (Maurer and 
Wessels 2001: 463) or loyal scrutiniser (Fraga 2001b). 
Appraisals that the Assembly’s European scrutiny is 
ineffective are ubiquitous (Fraga 2001b: 366; Guedes 
and Coutinho 2006: 101; Magone 2006: 18; Miranda 
Jorge 2001: 38; Miranda and Medeiros 2006: 513; 
Ramos 1995: 185). Such appraisals were not undue. 
In the two decades following Portugal’s EU accession, 
spanning the period from IV to IX legislature (1985-
2005), only 70 out of a total of 1866 plenary debates 
addressed EU matters, which is less than 5% (Cunha 
2009: 23). Ana Fraga, a former clerk of the European 
Affairs Committee (Comissão de Assuntos Europeus), 
attested, nonetheless, that regarding specific questions 
of national interest the Assembly could influence 
or even reinforce the Government’s position in the 
Council (2001b: 368). Similarly, a study of the Assembly’s 
involvement in Community affairs during the legislative 
session 1992-1993 showed that “notwithstanding 
an emphatic ‘deficit’ of action by parliamentary 
committees […], the European Community’s weight 
is so big that it translates into an intense presence in 
the debate and parliamentary work” (Sá 1994: 409). This 
increased presence of the Community in the Assembly 
was principally attributable to the Portuguese 
Presidency during the first semester of 1992 and the 
Maastricht negotiations. While Magone agreed that 
the Assembly could enhance “the influencing ability 
of its national government” (1996: 162), he observed 
that the parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs was 
“very sporadic and deferential to the Government” 
(Magone 2007a: 122). Yet whereas the Government 
remains the main scrutiny addressee and whereas the 
Assembly’s participation in EU decision making was 
so far “necessarily intermediated by the Government” 
(Roseira 2010: 396), it is no longer true that the “whole 
process of scrutiny is ex post” (Magone 2007b: 241). 
The finding that “the European integration process 
did not change the pattern of behaviour between the 
executive and legislative branch” has become equally 
untenable (Magone 2006: 20).
The emerging dynamic analysed in this article mitigates 
a bulk of these arguments. The European Union has 
proven to be the external link that propelled the reform 
(Magone 2007a: 129). This is not the first time that the 
Union has influenced internal constitutional relations 
in Portugal. As has been observed, “the thickening of 
the institutional networks between the supranational 
and national levels reinforced even more the prospects 
of democratic consolidation and institutionalisation” 
(Magone 1996: 158). Actually, one of the major political 
factors for EU accession was “the desire to strengthen 
pluralist democratic institutions” (Cunha 1983: 322). 
Oft-quoted patrimonial and clientelistic features of 
Portuguese politics (Magone 2007a: 116) have been 
surmounted to the extent that the Assembly now 
has greater opportunities for input in the shaping 
of EU decisions. In fact, it is plausible that precisely 
these features have contributed to the scrutiny reform 
through the MPs’ relations with their compatriot, 
two-time Commission President José Manuel Durão 
Barroso. To be sure, contacts with EU institutions are 
not an entirely new activity, as the Assembly has 
been reported receiving EU documentation from the 
Commission and the European Parliament ever since 
the Maastricht era (Magone 1996: 156). However, the 
scope and intensity of these information channels have 
gained momentum.
We proceed with an analysis of the Assembly’s 
prerogatives concerning EU decision making. After 
examining the relevant provisions of the Constitution, 
we turn to the 2006 European Scrutiny Act. We dissect 
this Act into several key elements that define European 
scrutiny in most national parliaments. These are the 
scope, objectives, information and instruments of 
scrutiny. We then present the reforms effected in 2010 
and Portugal’s participation in the Barroso initiative.
Constitutional framework of the 
Assembly’s European competence
The Portuguese Assembly derives three EU-related 
competences from the Constitution. 
First, the Constitution entrenches the Assembly’s ex 
ante involvement in EU decision making by obliging 
the Assembly to make pronouncements on EU matters 
in the sphere of its exclusive legislative competence.9 
9  Article 161(n) of the Constitution. This provision was 
introduced by Lei Constitucional no. 1/97 of 20 September 1997.
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In Otero’s opinion, this constitutional provision 
represents the recognition that, in the context of the 
European Union, Parliament has suffered a “clear erosion 
of the legislative power”, because the Government or 
the persons appointed by it have acquired “exclusive 
decision-making protagonism” in areas falling within the 
Assembly’s exclusive legislative competence (1997: 143). 
Second, it pertains to the Assembly to supervise and 
consider Portugal’s participation in the process of 
constructing the European Union.10 
Third, the Government is under a constitutional duty to 
submit to the Assembly information on the construction 
of the European Union in good time.11 
Statutory and informal 
framework of the Assembly’s 
European competence
Scope of scrutiny
The current statutory regulation of the Assembly’s European 
competence is the Act on the Monitoring, Assessment and 
Pronouncement by the Assembly of the Republic Within 
the Scope of the Process of Constructing the European 
Union of 2006 (European Scrutiny Act).12 This Act foresees 
both ex ante and ex post instruments of parliamentary 
participation in secondary EU decision making, for which 
purpose there shall be regular consultations between 
the Assembly and the Government.13 It is notable that 
the Assembly is obliged to pronounce itself not only on 
draft EU legislation falling within the ambit of its exclusive 
legislative competence but also on documents containing 
guidelines for EU policies and measures.14 This is a wide-
ranging competence, because it encompasses both 
legislative and non-legislative EU initiatives in all policy 
fields, formerly called pillars (Assembly of the Republic 
2007: 5, 17). Below we analyse the Assembly’s scrutiny 
competence regarding the non-Community fields of 
action.
10 Article 163(f ) of the Constitution. This provision was 
introduced by Lei Constitucional no. 1/92 of 25 November 1992.
11 Article 197(1)(i) of the Constitution. This provision was 
introduced by Lei Constitucional no. 1/92 of 25 November 1992.
12 Lei no. 43/2006 Acompanhamento, Apreciação e 
Pronúncia pela Assembleia da República no Âmbito do Processo 
de Construção da União Europeia of 25 August 2006.
13 Articles 1(2) of the European Scrutiny Act and 261(2) 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly no. 1/2007 of 1 
September 2007 (Regimento da Assembleia da República).
14 Article 4(2) of the European Scrutiny Act.
In the eyes of the Assembly, the transfer of the former 
Third Pillar to the First Pillar affects its scrutiny insofar 
as new proposals falling under the transferred areas 
come within the terms of the Barroso initiative and are 
directly transmitted by the Commission. This assists 
Parliament in having a say both in accordance with 
the European Scrutiny Act and in the framework of the 
political dialogue with the Commission (COSAC 2006b: 
173). No difference in scrutinising the substance of 
such proposals is envisaged. In other words, not only 
will the Assembly not abandon its scrutiny because 
the European Parliament will gain competence in the 
transferred policy areas, but its scrutiny potential will 
actually augment.
As regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), the Constitution charges the Armed Forces with 
“fulfilling Portugal’s commitments in the military field 
and taking part in humanitarian and peace missions 
undertaken by international organisations to which 
Portugal belongs”15 and the Assembly with “supervising 
the involvement of military contingents and security 
forces abroad”16. In 2003, the Assembly passed the 
Act Regulating the Assessment by the Assembly 
of the Republic of the Involvement of Portuguese 
Military Contingents Abroad.17 Under this statute, 
the Government shall, prior to deploying Portuguese 
military troops abroad, communicate its decision to 
do so to the Assembly for ex ante assessment and post 
facto monitoring. The Government shall submit two 
types of reports to the Assembly: a semester report 
on the involvement of the Portuguese military abroad 
and a final report within 60 days of the termination 
of a mission. Within the Assembly, scrutiny of these 
reports is the competence of the National Defence 
Committee. The Standing Orders of this Committee 
expressly envisage its duties to monitor Portugal’s 
participation in the construction of the European Union 
in the areas falling within its portfolio and to take part 
in periodic meetings with counterpart parliamentary 
committees from the other Member States.18 The 
Assembly scrutinises CFSP decisions by way of “overall 
assessment” (COSAC 2005b: 107). Although no specific 
arrangements exist in the Assembly for scrutinising 
15 Article 275(5) of the Constitution.
16 Article 163(i) of the Constitution.
17 Lei no. 46/2003 Lei que Regula o Acompanhamento, 
Pela Assembleia da República, do Envolvimento de Contingentes 
Militares Portugueses no Estrangeiro of 22 August 2003.
18 Articles 3(e) and 4(j) of the Standing Orders of the 
National Defence Committee of 17 November 2009.
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civilian CSDP missions (COSAC 2005b: 108), the regular 
meetings that the National Defence Committee holds 
with the Ministry of National Defence also deal with 
matters related to the Union’s civilian or military actions 
(COSAC 2006a: 57). 
With respect to the Union’s external relations, the 
Assembly in principle does not hold the Government 
to account for negotiations within the Council. It 
scrutinises neither international agreements falling 
under the exclusive competence of the EU, such as 
common commercial policy, nor those falling under 
the shared competence. However, at any time during 
the negotiations, the Foreign Affairs Committee may 
resort to regular mechanisms of political accountability 
of the Government (COSAC 2008b: 114). Furthermore, 
there is no systematic scrutiny of EU accession treaties. 
This means that the Assembly intervenes in the phase 
of approval of a given accession treaty according to 
the procedure applicable to all other treaties (COSAC 
2008a: 178-179).
Finally, the Assembly is “not directly involved” in the 
processes of open method of coordination, but 
acknowledges that they facilitate both access to 
comparative statistics for different Member States and 
the monitoring of what their respective governments 
are planning in relation to employment, growth, 
training, new technologies, the knowledge society, 
cutting red tape, etc (COSAC 2007b: 115).
Objectives of scrutiny
The main objective of the Assembly’s European scrutiny 
is to hold the Portuguese Government to account 
for the positions held in the Council. This stems from 
the constitutional link between the Assembly and 
the Government. Namely, whereas the Government 
is generally responsible both to the President of the 
Republic and the Assembly, it is politically responsible 
only to the Assembly.19 There is, however, no procedure 
of mandating the ministers.
Besides the scrutiny of the Government, the European 
Affairs Committee is, by virtue of the European Scrutiny 
Act, explicitly charged with developing relations with 
EU institutions. This is to be done by: (a) intensifying 
exchanges with the European Parliament and organising 
regular meetings with members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), particularly those elected in Portugal; 
(b) promoting meetings or hearings with EU institutions, 
bodies and agencies on matters important to Portugal; 
19 Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution.
(c) promoting inter-parliamentary cooperation within 
the EU; and (d) appointing Portuguese representatives 
to COSAC and assessing its outcomes.20 The right of 
the European Affairs Committee to invite Portuguese 
MEPs to participate in its work is specifically foreseen 
in its Standing Orders.21 Another noteworthy aspect 
of the work of the European Affairs Committee is 
the organisation of public debates and hearings on 
European topics with civil society representatives with 
a view to creating a public European forum at the 
national level (Magone 2006: 19).22
Since “Parliament’s monitoring can include the activities 
of all EU institutions that it deems relevant for the 
scrutiny procedure” (COSAC 2010: 394), maintaining 
contact with EU institutions is a complementary 
means of participating in EU affairs.23 Since by the time 
parliamentary scrutiny commences, the Government’s 
negotiation position is typically not yet defined or is 
unavailable, scrutiny is in practice primarily directed 
at documents received from EU institutions, especially 
the Commission’s initiatives (COSAC 2007b: 111). The 
European Affairs Committee describes the addressee 
of its scrutiny as follows:
Although most of the documents scrutinised are 
those of the Commission, in terms of steps taken/
positions adopted, scrutiny is directed primarily at the 
Government. Accordingly, neither of these entities can 
be regarded as the primary subject of scrutiny (COSAC 
2007b: 111; emphasis in original).
Information for scrutiny
To aid Parliament’s European scrutiny, the Government 
is obliged to keep it duly informed about the positions 
and proposals that are or will be discussed by EU 
institutions. The Government shall send the Assembly 
all relevant documents as soon as they reach the 
Council. The documents listed exempli causa in the 
European Scrutiny Act include: draft treaties to be 
concluded by the Union or between the Member 
States within the framework of the Union; proposals 
for binding and non-binding acts; the Commission’s 
instruments of legislative programming; legislative 
resolutions on Council common positions; passerelle 
20 Article 6(2)(g)-(j) of the European Scrutiny Act.
21 Article 4(2) of the Standing Orders of the European 
Affairs Committee of 18 November 2009 (Regulamento da 
Comissão de Assuntos Europeus).
22 Article 6(2)(m) of the European Scrutiny Act.
23 Interview with Bruno Dias Pinheiro, clerk of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Assembly, Lisbon, 8 June 2010.
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authorisations; agendas, minutes and results of Council 
sessions; subsidiarity reports; consultation documents; 
major economic, social and other guidelines; and 
annual reports of the European Court of Auditors.24 
Many of these documents are also provided directly 
by the Commission. In addition to the information 
and documents obtained via the Barroso initiative, 
the Assembly receives from the European Parliament 
those resolutions that may be of relevance to national 
parliaments. 
Moreover, the Assembly has had permanent 
representation in Brussels since 1 January 2007 in the form 
of a representative to the COSAC Secretariat and since 
24 June 2008 in the form of a permanent representative 
to the EU. The main task of the representative is to relay 
information about the EU decision-making process 
to the Assembly as a qualitative support for scrutiny. 
The other tasks include the setting up of a network 
of contacts with EU institutions and other national 
parliaments, monitoring European Parliament debates, 
gathering comparative information on parliamentary 
practices and preparing reports at the request of 
the Assembly.25 The representative works under the 
supervision of the Secretary-General of the Assembly 
and prepares a report on his or her work prior to the 
end of each legislative session (COSAC 2009a: 213-215).
Instruments of scrutiny
The Assembly’s key instruments of European scrutiny 
are: reports, formal written opinions, reasoned opinions, 
resolutions, debates and meetings on EU issues. We 
analyse them in turn.
1. Report (relatório). Reports on draft EU initiatives are 
prepared by both specialised committees and the 
European Affairs Committee. They provide a summary 
and conclusions about a given proposal.26 They usually 
furnish a basis for the adoption of formal written 
opinions. 
However, reporting is not only the competence of 
Parliament. The Government is under a duty to lay before 
the Assembly annual reports on Portugal’s participation 
in the process of constructing the European Union, 
which provide information on the EU decisions that had 
the greatest impact on Portugal in the previous year 
and on the measures that the Government has taken 
24 Article 5(1) of the European Scrutiny Act.
25 Regulation no. 354/2008 of 24 June 2008.
26 Article 16(5) of Standing Orders of the European Affairs 
Committee.
as a result of those decisions.27 In Fraga’s view, these 
annual reports are not a particularly useful instrument 
of ex post control of the Government because of 
Parliament’s inability to analyse these reports rigorously 
(2001a: 610).  
2. Formal written opinion (parecer). The Assembly is 
statutorily obliged to adopt a formal written opinion 
whenever an EU proposal falls within the ambit of its 
exclusive legislative competence.28 Correspondingly, 
the Government is under a statutory duty to inform the 
Assembly of the existence of such proposals, invite it to 
issue a written opinion and provide it in good time with 
a summary of the proposal, an analysis of the proposal’s 
implications and, if available, the position that it has 
taken. Written opinions are prepared by the European 
Affairs Committee in consultation with competent 
specialised committees. Once formulated, they are sent 
to the plenary for debate and voting. The Assembly 
may prepare new opinions in subsequent phases of EU 
decision making. With respect to non-legislative, non-
binding or consultative EU documents that fall outside 
the ambit of its exclusive legislative competence, the 
Assembly may but need not formulate formal written 
opinions and the Government need not inform the 
Assembly of such initiatives.
It should be stressed that although there is formally 
no scrutiny reserve, the Government’s obligation to 
obtain the Assembly’s formal written opinion on a 
given EU initiative sometimes practically functions 
as a scrutiny reserve. For example, during Council 
negotiations on the PNR Framework Decision, the 
Government informally agreed to this proposal, but it 
withheld its formal agreement pending the receipt of 
the Assembly’s opinion. This caused disenchantment 
among MPs, because the Government had in advance 
frustrated meaningful parliamentary pronouncement.29
3. Reasoned opinion (parecer fundamentado). In 
accordance with the Lisbon Treaty and the Subsidiarity 
Protocol, the Assembly may send the Presidents of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
reasoned opinions stating why a draft EU initiative, or 
any subsequent amendment thereof, fails to comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity. Reasoned opinions 
are only adopted regarding EU documents that fall 
within the ambit of the competence shared between 
the Union and the Member States (Bermann 2008; 
27 Article 5(3) of the European Scrutiny Act.
28 Articles 1(1), 2 and 6(2)(b) of the European Scrutiny Act.
29 Interview with Bruno Dias Pinheiro, clerk of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Assembly, Lisbon, 8 June 2010.
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Louis 2008). Reasoned opinions as a rule take the form 
of resolutions.30
4. Resolution. As the most far-reaching instrument in its 
scrutiny arsenal, the Assembly may adopt resolutions 
on EU proposals that fall within its exclusive legislative 
competence but also on any other document 
emanating from an EU institution, such as green and 
white papers, strategic guidelines, communications, 
etc.31 Resolutions are always adopted by the plenary.
5. Debates. A number of plenary and committee 
debates concern EU issues.32 
First, a plenary debate is held with the Government 
following the last European Council meeting of each 
EU Presidency.
Second, as an increasingly important tool of ex ante 
involvement, the plenary debate in the first half of 
the year may analyse the Commission’s annual policy 
strategy and that in the second half of the year the 
Commission’s legislative and work programme. 
Third, there is a plenary debate each year on the 
aforesaid Government’s annual reports on Portugal’s 
participation in the construction of the Union. The 
Assembly or the Government may also instigate 
debates on all other subjects under discussion in EU 
institutions that fall within their areas of responsibility.33 
Fourth, after each COSAC meeting the Chairman of 
the European Affairs Committee presents a report. This 
report, together with any contributions or conclusions 
reached by COSAC, is debated in the European Affairs 
Committee and the main issues arising there from are 
duly taken into account in the work of the Assembly 
(COSAC 2010: 404).
6. Meetings. In the weeks before and after European 
Council meetings, the European Affairs Committee 
holds meetings with the Government. Similarly, in the 
week before or after the meetings of the Council, there 
will be joint meetings between the European Affairs 
Committee, the competent specialised committee 
and the member of the Government in charge of the 
matter.34
The effects of all these scrutiny instruments remain 
within the political sphere. There are no legal sanctions 
for cases when the Government disregards Parliament’s 
views. However, the described instruments are not futile. 
As the Assembly explains, where the Government fails 
to comply with formal written opinions or resolutions, 
30 Article 3 of the European Scrutiny Act.
31 Articles 6(2)(e) and 7(5)-(6) of the European Scrutiny Act.
32 Article 4(1)(a)-(b) of the European Scrutiny Act.
33 Article (4)(4) of the European Scrutiny Act.
34 Article 4(1)(c)-(d) of the European Scrutiny Act.
where it fails to request their issuance or where it fails 
to provide the required information, the Assembly 
may resort to ex post political sanctions. To wit, the 
Government bears “a political onus to provide sufficient 
grounds so as not to be subject to widespread criticism, 
which in the last instance could undermine the majority 
supporting it and trigger the more drastic forms of 
supervision such as a motion of censure” (COSAC 2007b: 
112). The MPs may also refuse to transpose directives 
that fall under the Assembly’s transposing competence 
or request an assessment of the Government’s decree-
laws that seek to transpose directives.35 With regard to 
primary EU law, the Assembly may refuse to approve a 
treaty negotiated by the Government. Yet these formal 
possibilities are hamstrung in practice, because the 
Government typically enjoys the support of a stable 
majority.
Finally, the Assembly’s influence on the Commission 
is limited to the importance that the Commission 
decides to attach to its reports, formal written opinions 
or resolutions. The Assembly also ascertains that its 
influence on the Council and the European Parliament 
is indirect and commensurate to the influence that it is 
able to exert on the Government and Portuguese MEPs 
respectively (COSAC 2007b: 112-113).
The reform of EU scrutiny 
procedures: refocusing on ex 
ante involvement
On 20 January 2010, the European Affairs Committee 
approved a new mechanism of scrutiny of EU initiatives 
(Assembleia da República 2010). Three types of scrutiny 
procedures are envisaged: enhanced, normal and 
urgent. All of these procedures refer to Commission 
initiatives. If an initiative does not originate from the 
Commission, the European Affairs Committee shall 
decide whether to conduct scrutiny at all.
1. Enhanced scrutiny. This procedure is a product of 
the Assembly’s positive experience with the Barroso 
initiative and centres on the Commission’s legislative 
and work programme. Enhanced scrutiny begins with 
a pre-selection process using the criterion of political 
relevance of an EU initiative for Portugal. Each specialised 
committee notifies the European Affairs Committee 
whether it intends to submit any Commission’s 
initiative to enhanced scrutiny. Upon receiving these 
35 See more on the transposition of directives in Portugal in 
(Sousa 1992).
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notices, the European Affairs Committee chooses from 
the pre-selected ones a maximum of six initiatives per 
year for enhanced scrutiny. A broader custom-made 
scrutiny programme is then drafted for each of the 
selected initiatives. Enhanced scrutiny proceeds on the 
basis of these programmes and includes a wide array of 
activities: seeking clarifications from the Government; 
obtaining information from EU institutions; exchanging 
information with other national parliaments; organising 
hearings with the competent Commissioner, the 
Presidency and the European Parliament’s rapporteur; 
holding public hearings; gathering views from 
stakeholders; and producing studies. All other 
initiatives are scrutinised in accordance with the normal 
procedure.
2. Normal scrutiny. This procedure differs from 
the enhanced one insofar as no specific scrutiny 
programmes are drawn up and no extra action is 
taken. An important innovation is the introduction of 
deadlines for the drafting of reports and formal written 
opinions. Specialised committees must do so within 
six weeks from the date of receipt of the Portuguese 
language version of a given EU initiative. Thereafter, the 
European Affairs Committee has two weeks to draft its 
own opinion. Also, in order to prevent the passivity of 
specialised committees, any member of the European 
Affairs Committee may request the competent 
specialised committee to issue a report.
3. Urgent scrutiny. The urgent procedure applies when 
the European Affairs Committee finds out, through 
IPEX36 or through its permanent representative in 
Brussels, that an EU initiative has raised doubts in other 
national parliaments about subsidiarity compliance.
Mastering the Barroso initiative: 
a new kind of coalition?
Since September 2006, the Assembly has received 
draft EU documents directly from the Commission as 
part of the so-called Barroso initiative. This unilateral 
commitment of the Commission consists in a wide-
ranging political dialogue with national parliaments 
not only on subsidiarity but also on the proportionality, 
36 IPEX stands for Interparliamentary EU Information 
Exchange and is an online database established in July 2006. 
It contains a complete catalogue of Commission documents 
from 2006 and parliamentary documents pertaining to the 
national scrutiny of decisions taken at the EU level. Each national 
parliament uploads the information and documents that it wishes 
to share with other national parliaments. See: www.ipex.eu.
legal basis, substance and political aspects of EU 
consultation documents and legislative and non-
legislative initiatives. Due to the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Barroso initiative was partly 
formalised in the form of a narrower procedure dubbed 
‘early warning mechanism’ (Jančić 2010: 32-36).37
For the Portuguese Assembly, this direct link with the 
Union’s legislative initiator did not merely represent a 
new source of information. In the words of a clerk of 
the European Affairs Committee, “it raised the profile 
of Parliament vis-à-vis the Government”.38 But how and 
why is this so?
In the wake of the adoption of the European Scrutiny 
Act, which coincided with the beginning of the Barroso 
initiative, the European Affairs Committee decided to 
pay special attention to the political dialogue with the 
Commission. The reason for it was to allow the Assembly 
to pronounce itself beyond subsidiarity, which, in 
the opinion of this Committee, “is not even the most 
important aspect of EU legislation”.39 In turn, the direct 
receipt of information on the Commission’s legislative 
activity reduces the Assembly’s dependence on the 
Government. This exchange of views and feedbacks 
prior to the onset of the EU legislative procedure 
eviscerates the Government’s inherent privilege of 
timely possession of all relevant information and pre-
empts its recourse to scapegoating practices, otherwise 
nurtured by the Union’s multilevel system (Herzog and 
Gerken 2007: 211-212).
Three key repercussions flow from this. 
First, since it is highly probable that the Assembly will 
receive relevant information from the Commission, the 
Government can no longer prevent the Assembly from 
acting by withholding information from it. 
Second, the Government cannot present negotiations 
in the Council as fait accompli, because the Assembly 
will be in direct dialogue with the Commission and 
will have the knowledge of the facts related to the 
EU legislative process, albeit only of those that the 
Commission is willing to share. 
Third, the Commission itself will be able to counter 
the Government whenever the latter, during Council 
negotiations, abstractly uses the Assembly as an excuse 
for unwavering adherence to its position. In these 
situations, the Commission can invoke the position 
37 Article 7 of Protocol no. 2 on the Application of the Principles 
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.
38 Interview with Bruno Dias Pinheiro, clerk of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Assembly, Lisbon, 8 June 2010.
39 Interview with Bruno Dias Pinheiro, clerk of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Assembly, Lisbon, 8 June 2010.
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obtained from the Assembly through the political 
dialogue and thereby reduce the Government’s room 
for manoeuvre.40
Such Assembly’s approach fits one of the patterns of 
strategic Europeanisation of national parliaments, 
whereby the latter attempt to overcome the nationally 
imposed constraints by bypassing the national 
government and engaging in direct dialogue with 
external actors, such as EU institutions (Auel 2007a; 
Auel and Benz 2005; Benz 2004: 887-888).
The immediate fruits of this newly enthusiastic approach 
to EU affairs are borne out by the Commission’s 
reports. The Portuguese Parliament has so far sent 
most opinions to the Commission. As a “particularly 
active chamber” and one with a “particular interest in 
subsidiarity questions”, the Assembly, while remaining 
silent in 2006, sent 19 opinions in 2007, 65 in 2008 and 
47 in 2009. This amounts to a total of 131 opinions in the 
period 2006-2009. By way of comparison, in the same 
period the French Sénat adopted a total of 65 opinions, 
the German Bundesrat 55, the Swedish Riksdag 51, 
the Czech Senát 49, the British House of Lords 44, the 
Danish Folketing 35, the Italian Senato 25, the Dutch 
States-General 23, the Italian Camera dei Deputati 16, 
the Austrian Bundesrat and the Irish Oireachtas 14 and 
so on (Kaczynski 2011: 9).
However, an analysis of the contents of the 
Assembly’s opinions in the period from 2006-2011 
reveals that they typically contain a description of 
the EU initiative scrutinised and a short verdict on 
whether subsidiarity was breached or not. In most 
cases, no justification or further commentary is 
provided.41 On occasion, the Assembly does offer 
substantive remarks. Only in these cases is the 
Commission likely to respond to the MPs’ concerns. 
For example, examining Iceland’s accession process, 
the Assembly inter alia found that this country’s 
policy of permitting whale hunting was at variance 
with the acquis. In reply to the Assembly, the 
Commission stated that the next progress report 
on Iceland would address this topic together with 
the recommendations raised in the Assembly’s 
opinion. In other replies, the Commission typically 
notes the Assembly’s stance on EU initiatives and 
40 Interviews with Bruno Dias Pinheiro held in Brussels on 
27 May 2008 in his capacity as representative of the Portuguese 
Assembly to the COSAC Secretariat as well as in Lisbon on 8 June 
2010 in his capacity as clerk of the European Affairs Committee.
41 See: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/
relations/relations_other/npo/portugal/2009_en.htm, accessed 
on 2 June 2011.
gives more information on the dossier in question. 
Conversely, the Commission almost always replies, 
for instance, to the opinions sent by the parliaments 
of France, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Since the Commission tends to send replies where 
parliamentary opinions address the contents of EU 
policies and provide substantive observations, this 
comparative insight means that the Portuguese 
scrutiny of EU affairs is still evolving. 
Yet the upsurge in the number of the opinions 
sent to the Commission should be assessed from 
a different viewpoint. In contrast to the previous 
situation, it signifies the Assembly’s pro-active 
attitude to scrutiny. If one recalls the standpoint of 
the European Affairs Committee that subsidiarity is 
not the most significant element of its involvement 
in EU decision making, then Portugal’s record in the 
political dialogue might be a ramification of a more 
comprehensive metamorphosis of its approach 
to European scrutiny. Interestingly, the European 
Affairs Committee has itself perceived that the shift 
towards more frequent relations with EU institutions 
has actually resulted in “the neglect of its scrutiny of 
the Government”, which will need to be bolstered.42
Lastly, the figures relating to the Barroso initiative 
reflect a more general flurry of the Assembly’s 
scrutiny activity in the post-2006 period. The 
statistical data show that in the period between 
October 2006 and mid-February 2009 the Assembly 
scrutinised a total of 204 EU initiatives (131 legislative 
and 73 non-legislative) and that the specialised 
committees adopted 156 reports, of which 126 
were definitively adopted by the European Affairs 
Committee (Comissão de Assuntos Europeus 2009). 
In the first legislative session of XI legislature only, 
which lasted from October 2009 to July 2010, the 
number of scrutinised EU initiatives was 192, with 83 
reports adopted by the specialised committees and 
55 by the European Affairs Committee (Comissão 
de Assuntos Europeus 2010). Contrarily, none was 
adopted before 2006. 
Since 2006 there has also been a degree of 
stabilisation and regularity in the other scrutiny 
activities, such as meetings, hearings and 
appearances organised or held by the European 
Affairs Committee as shown in the table and graph 
below. 
42  Interview with Bruno Dias Pinheiro, clerk of the 
European Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Assembly, Lisbon, 
8 June 2010.
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Table 1. Share of the scrutiny activities of the European 
Affairs Committee as absolute number of the total number 
of committee activities in the Assembly
European Affairs 
Committee
Meetings
(ordinary)
Hearings Appearances*
XI Legislature, 1st Session
15.10.2009. – 22.07.2010.
38 of 645 18 of 370 9 of 226
X Legislature, 4th Session
15.09.2008. – 14.10.2009.
29 of 659 11 of 340 13 of 152
X Legislature, 3rd Session
15.09.2007. – 14.09.2008.
51 of 646 39 of 388 11 of 178
X Legislature, 2nd Session
15.09.2006. – 14.09.2007.
57 of 669 34 of 328 12 of 174
X Legislature, 1st Session
10.03.2005. – 14.09.2006.
54 of 844 31 of 444 17 of 208
IX Legislature, 3rd Session
15.09.2004. – 09.03.2005
16 of 198 3 of 86 15 of 56
IX Legislature, 2nd Session
15.09.2003. – 14.09.2004
50 of 620 24 of 307 59 of 203
IX Legislature, 1st Session
05.04.2002. – 14.09.2003.
80 of 815
9.81%
64 of 513
12.47%
85 of 377
22.54%
Graph 1. Share of the scrutiny activities of the European 
Affairs Committee as percentage of the total number of 
committee activities in the Assembly
Source: Assembleia da República, Divisão de Informação 
Legislativa e Parlamentar
* Although there is no clear-cut criterion for 
differentiating between a hearing and an appearance, 
they are categorised separately in the activity reports of 
the European Affairs Committee.
The data presented above represent a nascent scrutiny 
trend in the Assembly. They can be interpreted in a 
threefold fashion.
First, the rising number of adopted reports means that 
EU initiatives are no longer adopted at arm’s length from 
the MPs. The scrutiny of EU affairs is becoming a routine 
business rather an ad hoc activity. EU documents are 
penetrating not only the European Affairs Committee 
but also the specialised committees. This transversal 
involvement is significant for a sustained performance 
of Parliament’s controlling and legitimating functions.
Second, the stabilisation of the number of meetings, 
hearings and appearances reflects the fact that the 
Assembly’s information sources have become more 
diversified and that its opportunity for a more informed 
scrutiny of EU policies has increased.
Third, and from a broader perspective, these findings, 
taken together with those relating to the Assembly’s 
participation in the Barroso initiative, allow us to 
conclude that Portugal is gradually joining the group 
of active parliaments, albeit that qualitative differences 
from other Member States remain salient. One wonders 
whether Portuguese MPs will build on these successful 
first steps in utilising their European scrutiny powers.
Concluding remarks: 
Europe discovered?
The foregoing analysis shows that the Portuguese 
Assembly has undergone a tacit renaissance in its 
engagement EU policy and decision making. This is a 
direct consequence of two factors: scrutiny reforms and 
the Barroso initiative. That these two factors occurred 
almost concomitantly only fuelled the transformation.
The major added value of the establishment in 2006 of 
a system of systematic scrutiny of EU affairs was that 
both the Assembly and the Government assumed 
duties in the scrutiny process. Parliamentary control of 
EU decisions has, therefore, ceased to be a matter of the 
Government’s good will. This development stands in 
stark contrast with the period preceding 2006, during 
which the Assembly operated informal scrutiny. This 
meant, for instance, that a dossier as politically salient 
as the Services Directive was not scrutinised at all.43 As a 
result of the changes implemented from 2006 onwards, 
the Assembly has asserted that its scrutiny system has 
become document-based. (COSAC 2007b: 113). In this 
sense, the Portuguese scrutiny system has become 
similar to the models embraced by both Houses of 
Parliament in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Italy, Ireland and Czech Republic, as well as by the Dutch 
Eerste Kamer and the Belgian Senate (COSAC 2005a: 
10-11; COSAC 2007a: 8). EU documents are now sifted 
43 Personal correspondence with Maria João Costa, a clerk 
of the European Affairs Committee, March-May 2011.
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in the early stages of the decision-making process, so 
that if an EU initiative is not scrutinised, this is because 
Parliament and not the Government decided so.
The Assembly has taken advantage of the Barroso 
initiative and emerged as a leader in the political 
dialogue with the Commission. Yet, compared to some 
other Member States, this leadership is more quantitative 
than qualitative and actual correspondence with the 
Commission remains exceptional. The importance of 
the Barroso initiative for the Portuguese Parliament lies 
elsewhere, however. It sparked the Assembly’s activity 
and its reformative approach to European scrutiny. 
Direct links with the Commission were supplemented 
with joint meetings and exchanges of documents 
with the European Parliament. The significance of the 
burgeoning of new informal practices of cross-level and 
cross-branch cooperation within the Union is nicely 
illustrated by the fact that the principal innovation is 
no longer, as it used to be some 15 years ago (Ramos 
1995: 182), the regular exchange of information with 
the Government but with the European Commission 
and, to a lesser extent, with the European Parliament 
and other national parliaments. While the Government 
continues being an important provider of information, 
the Assembly has successfully begun an emancipation 
of sorts, so that its scrutiny ceased to be dependent 
only on information furnished by the Government.
On a larger scale, one is advised to revisit the hypothesis 
that the national parliaments’ European competences 
derive only from “a wide range of factors of the internal 
order” (Filipe 2005: 65). Direct links with EU institutions 
and their utilisation for external or internal political 
ends do not diminish the foremost importance of the 
inextricable constitutional tie between the Assembly 
and the Government. It does, however, mean that 
this tie is becoming endowed with another facet 
extraneous to the Portuguese constitutional order. 
The case of Portugal demonstrates that this facet can 
be the espousal of ex ante involvement. This is all the 
more significant since, as Fraga has rightly underlined, 
political accountability concerns the Government’s 
conduct in Council negotiations much more than its 
participation in the transposition of EU acts (2001a: 604, 
609). Since the existence of formal rights or scrutiny 
mechanisms cannot automatically be equated with 
their utilisation in practice (Auel 2007b), an empirical 
insight into the contents of the Assembly’s ex ante 
scrutiny of draft EU initiatives is a necessary prerequisite 
for testing the quality of Portuguese parliamentary 
supervision of EU decision making. Though any such 
query is impaired by the lack of clear-cut criteria for 
assessing scrutiny effectiveness (Raunio and Wiberg 
2010), ex ante parliamentary involvement should guide 
future research endeavours (Raunio 2009, Sprungk 
2010).
Yet one should also not overestimate the Assembly’s 
accomplishments. The Assembly has itself assessed 
that “more important than what the text of the Treaty 
may guarantee to national parliaments is what the new 
Treaty may offer the citizens” (COSAC 2007b: 114). On a 
similar note, Quadros has argued that “the participation 
of national parliaments can reinforce the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union, but it is not an essential 
condition to achieve the Union’s approximation to the 
citizens of the Member States” (2004: 313). The Assembly, 
thus, understands itself solely as one element of the 
Union’s democracy, as part of a larger constitutional 
construct composed of EU institutions, national organs 
of sovereignty and citizens. 
Finally, it ought to be conceded that the Portuguese 
Parliament’s mission of “discovering Europe” (Magone 
1996) has of late turned into that of Europe discovered, 
even though only in formal terms since the Assembly 
cannot boast the levels of institutionalisation and 
professionalisation found in Britain, France or Germany 
(Magone 2007b: 230). That notwithstanding, despite 
the erosion of its competences due to the rapid 
process of Europeanisation, the Assembly was able to 
regain a portion of influence in EU decision making 
by refurbishing its scrutiny powers and redirecting 
them to a considerable extent towards EU institutions. 
The Assembly has become aware of the multifarious 
identity of the Union’s democracy. It is a laggard no 
more. The Portuguese Parliament has significantly 
Europeanised. The instalment of a host of EU-oriented 
rather than Government-oriented scrutiny procedures 
is an essential testament thereto. From a broader 
perspective, the Portuguese case indicates that 
national parliaments possess the capacity to adapt 
to European integration. If accrued, even slow and 
piecemeal adaptations can lead to more overarching 
parliamentary reforms. These findings are potentially 
replicable. The analysis of the Portuguese Parliament 
provides good reasons to believe that other domestic 
legislatures, described as latecomers or slow adapters, 
could follow the same path.
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